NYLS Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 4 Volume XL, Number 4, 1996

Article 2

January 1996

ONE HUNDRED YEARS AFTER PLESSY: THE FAILURE OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE POTENTIALS FOR ELITEST AND
NEUTRAL ANTI-DEMOCRACY
Daniel R. Gordon

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/nyls_law_review

Recommended Citation
Daniel R. Gordon, ONE HUNDRED YEARS AFTER PLESSY: THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
POTENTIALS FOR ELITEST AND NEUTRAL ANTI-DEMOCRACY, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 641 (1996).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NYLS Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

ONE HUNDRED YEARS AFTER PLESSY:
THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
POTENTIALS FOR ELITIST AND NEUTRAL ANTI-DEMOCRACY
DANIEL R. GORDON*
I. INTRODUCTION: PLESSY AND THE CHALLENGE

TO DEMOCRATIC LAWMAKING
May 18, 1996 marks the one hundredth anniversary of the
constitutional legitimation of racist law in the United States. The United
States Supreme Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson' on May 18, 1896.
Plessy validated the separate but equal doctrine, and provided federal,
constitutional and judicial imprimatur to the system of segregation that
developed in the late nineteenth century and lasted through the first half
of the twentieth century
Only after a long political, social, and legal
struggle,' did the African-American community successfully challenge
Plessy in Brown v. Board of Education5 in 1954. Unfortunately, Plessy's
impact did not cease when the Brown Court held that separate but equal
schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.'
To this day, the aftermath of Plessy continues to plague the United
States' social, political, and legal systems. The struggle against state
sponsored and legally sanctioned racism has continued for decades since
the Brown decision.7 Patterns of racial segregation in schools and
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; B.A., Haverford
College; J.D. Boston College.
1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

2. Id. at 548. The concept of separate but equal in Plessy derived from the
Louisiana statute analyzed by the Plessy Court. Id. at 540.
3. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (3d ed. 1974);
Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the
ProgressiveEra, Part1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 461-77
(1982).
4. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BoARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1975).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

6. Id. at 495.
7. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS,
1954-63 (1988); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Swarn
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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residential neighborhoods continue to exist into the 1990s. s AfricanAmericans continue their struggle to gain influence within the political9
and economic'0 systems. However, the impact of Plessy stretches
beyond the legally sanctioned racism faced by African-Americans and
other people of color." Plessy celebrated the virtues of democratically
created law which reflected the popular will of the citizenry.12 The
Plessy case posited a model of populist lawmaking that would benefit
people of all races. The greatest impact of Plessy in 1896 involved the
failure of democratically created law to be just in the regulation of
personal relationships between individuals and social groups. Plessy
demonstrated why democracy fails when people utilize law to guide social
decisionmaking such as who may marry whom,' 3 or who may attend
8. See generally DOUGLAS A. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
(1993); Rodney J.
Blackman, Returning to Plessy, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 766 (1992); David Crump, From
APARTHEID, SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS

Freeman to Brown and Back Again: Principle,Pragmatism, andProximate Cause in the
School DesegregationDecisions, 68 WASH. L. REv. 753 (1993); Donald E. Lively,
Desegregationand the Supreme Court: The FatalAttraction of Brown, 20 HASTINGS

CONST. L.Q. 649 (1993); Roberta L. Steele, All Things Not Being Equal: The Casefor
Race Separate Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 591 (1993); Juan Williams, The
Survival ofRacism Under the Constitution, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 7, 27-31 (1992);
Mary E. Wright, NaturalRights Versus Civil Rights on the African-Americans' Elusive

Questfor Parity, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 1 (1990); Cynthia Bums, Comment, The
Fading of the Brown Objective: A Historical Perspective of the MarshallLegacy in
Education, 35 How. L.J. 95 (1991).
9. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); LANi GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF
THE MAJORITY, FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

(1994);

Lynn A. Baker, DirectDemocracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective,
67 CHL-KENT L. REv. 707 (1991).
10. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict
scrutiny to and striking down Richmond's plan to award minority-owned businesses 30%
of the city's construction contracts because there was no showing of past racial
discrimination in city's construction industry which could have amounted to a compelling
state interest).
11. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind,"
44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
12. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
13. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia's law
prohibiting marriage between African-Americans and whites).
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school with whom. 4 Plessy led to restrictions on the democratic creation
of law that still exist in the 1990s."
This article examines the negative impact of Plessy on the democratic
creation of law, identifies two types of anti-democratic processes in
lawmaking: the undemocratic creation of law 6 and the neutral
prohibition on lawmaking. 7 Finally, the article explains why the neutral
prohibition on lawmaking should become dominant constitutional doctrine
in the United States.18
II. PLESSY AND THE CoNsTrruTIONAuTY OF SEPARATE BUT EQUAL
Homer Adolph Plessy bought a first-class railroad ticket between New
Orleans and Covington, Louisiana.' 9 He took his seat peacefully in a
first-class coach, which was reserved for white passengers only. 20
Authoritites issued an arrest warrant alleging that Plessy insisted on
entering and remaining in a coach assigned to white passengers. 2' Plessy
was arraigned, and posted $500 for his appearance in the Criminal Court
of the Parish of New Orleans.' Plessy faced criminal proceedings for
allegedly violating a Louisiana act that required the separation of white
and black railroad passengers.'
The act that Plessy allegedly violated required that railway companies
carrying passengers in Louisiana provide equal but separate
accommodations for the white and black races. 24 The act gave railway
companies the choice of providing two or more passenger coaches for
each train or dividing passenger coaches by a partition. The act also
prohibited members of either race from sitting in a coach or area not
14. See Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding that

Missouri's failure to admit African-American candidate to law school or open a law
school for African-Americans violated the Equal Protection Clause).

15. See infra notes 262-85 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 214-37 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 238-61 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 301-05 and accompanying text.
19. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, at 3-4, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)

(No. 210) (Jurisdictional).
20. Id. at 4.
21. Brief on behalf of Defendant in Error, at 5-6, Plessy (No. 210).
22. Brief for Plaintiff in Error, at 1, Plessy (No. 210).

23. Id. at 2.
24. Exparte Plessy, 11 So. 948, 948-49 (La. 1892).
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Railroad employees risked penalties if they
assigned to their race.'
refused or neglected to assign passengers to the proper racial coach or
area. If convicted, Plessy faced as much as a $25 fine or up to twenty
days imprisonment under the statute. 26
When appearing for arraignment in the Criminal Court of the Parish
of New Orleans, Plessy objected to the court's jurisdiction,' and asserted
that the Louisiana act under which he stood charged violated the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments by establishing a discriminatory
distinction between citizens of the United States based on race.28
Plessy's plea setting up the unconstitutionality of the Louisiana railroad
segregation act failed in the criminal court when the Judge overruled the
plea.29 Plessy applied for writs of certiorari and prohibition to the
Supreme Court of Louisiana.30 The court issued a provisional writ of
for the duration of deliberations by the Louisiana Supreme
prohibition
31
Court.

A. The Louisiana Supreme Court Distinguishes Between
Separateness, Community, and Equality
Plessy's petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition from the
Louisiana Supreme Court failed32 when the Louisiana high court found
the Thirteenth Amendment inapplicable 3 and the Fourteenth Amendment
not violated.' The Louisiana Supreme Court summarily dismissed the
relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment to Plessy's objections about
Louisiana's railway segregation act. The court relied solely on The Civil
Rights Cases5 which held that the Thirteenth Amendment provided
narrow protection against slavery and involuntary servitude but no
protection against the denial of equal accommodations in public
conveyances such as the railway on which Plessy purchased his first class
25. Id. at 949.
26. Id.
27. Brief on Behalf of Defendant in Error, at 6-10, Plessy (No. 210).

28. Id. at 10.
29. Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 948.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 951.
Id.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 951.

35. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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ticket.3 6 According to the Louisiana high court, the denial of equal
accommodations on public conveyances imposed no badge of slavery. At
most, denial of accommodations on public conveyances implicated the
Fourteenth Amendment." Thus, the Louisiana high court confined its
constitutional analysis of the Louisiana railway segregation act to the
Fourteenth Amendment.3 8
The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that statutes or regulations
enforcing the separation of races on public conveyances or in other public
circumstances failed to contravene the equal protection or privileges and
immunities clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment." The Louisiana court
conceived of a separation of the races as falling within two views of the
meaning of equal protection. One view of equal protection conceived of
equality in two very narrow terms. Another view utilized a historical
analysis to place equality into a historical context.
Equality meant both substantial sameness in accommodations
provided' ° and application of a statute or regulation with perfect fairness
and sameness.4" The equality required by the Fourteenth Amendment
existed, so long as the railway cars for both races remained substantially
similar and the rule requiring that each race rode in a separate car applied
the same to each race. In Plessy, the Louisiana statute required equal
accommodations for each race,42 and it applied to the races so equally
that the record from the New Orleans parish court below failed to disclose
whether the person prosecuted was white or black.43
The Louisiana high court conceived of the meaning of equality so
narrowly that the impact of the separate but equal doctrine on racial
identity or sense of community failed to matter in the court's analysis.'
The court viewed equality in mechanistic terms. No consideration of the
impact of racial separation on members of each race entered into the
analysis. The court observed that even if prejudice motivated the statute,
all that mattered was that railway accomodations remained substantially
equal.45 The Louisiana court succeeded in uncoupling the concept of
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 949.
Id.
Id. at 949-51.
Id. at 950.
See id. at 951.
See id.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 951.
Id. at 950.
Id. at 951.
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In the court's view,
separateness from the concept of equality.
separateness could not independently create inequality; so long as each
race possessed access to similar railway coaches and the statute applied
similarly to each race, the impact of separateness remained irrelevant.
In addition to defining the Fourteenth Amendment concept of equality
mechanistically and narrowly, the Louisiana high court analyzed the
Fourteenth Amendment concept of equality in broad historical terms. The
court viewed the adoption and application of the Fourteenth Amendment
as part of an almost fifty-year portrait of American legal history. The
United States Supreme Court failed, up to the time the Louisiana Supreme
Court was considering Plessy, to consider the constitutional validity of
statutorily required separate but equal doctrine.' However, several other
state courts had already validated separate but equal law.47 For example,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found that separate schools for
black children failed to violate civil, social, political, and constitutional
rights." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that separating races on
public conveyances failed to violate anyone's rights. a9 That the
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania cases predated the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment mattered little to the Supreme Court of
Louisiana.'
The early dates of the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania cases proved
irrelevant to the Louisiana Supreme Court for a number of reasons. The
Louisiana court chose to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in the
context of a broad historical sweep of time. For the Louisiana Court,
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts represented states where the civil rights
of blacks existed prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
The Louisiana court cited a number of state cases that recognized the
validity of the separate but equal doctrine. Not only were cases from
Massachusetts and Pennsylvania included on the list, but so were such
Union bastions as Ohio, 2 New York53 and Indiana,' as well as
46. Id. at 950; see Stephen J. Riegel, The Persistent Careerof Jim Crow: Lower
Federal Courts and the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 1865-1896, 28 AM. J. LEG.
HIST. 17 (1984).

47. Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 950.

48. Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

West Chester & P.R.R. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 209 (1867).
Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 950.
Id.
Id. (citing State v. McCann, 21 Ohio 198, 210 (1871)).
Id. (citing People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883)).
Id. (citing Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874)).
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federal court cases.' The Louisiana high court viewed the adoption and
application of the Fourteenth Amendment in the political and civil rights
contexts of northern states that accorded equal rights to African-Americans
when the Fourteenth Amendment became law. 6 If separate but equal
existed in northern states at the time of the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment, certainly, then, the northern authors and supporters of the
Fourteenth Amendment intended that equality not require the end of
separateness. The Louisiana court capped this analysis by stating that the
Fourteenth Amendment "created no new rights whatever, but only
extended the operation of existing rights and furnished additional
protection for such rights."'
The Supreme Court of Louisiana placed the Fourteenth Amendment
into the context of separate but equal practices that predated the
Amendment. Not only did the Louisiana court point to separation of the
races by northern states in public schools and on public conveyances, but
the court also mentioned the law of marriage." Separateness failed to
create inequality under the Fourteenth Amendment because American legal
custom long accepted and recognized separateness as not impacting
equality. The very concept of equality meant only that access be accorded
to similar accommodations such as railway coaches and that similar
enforcement of a statute or regulation be applied to both races.
Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court not only adopted the
analysis of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, but expanded that analysis in
Plessy.
B. Plessy and the United States Supreme Court: Adopting
the Louisiana Approach and More
Like the Louisiana high court, the United States Supreme Court in
Plessy dismissed the relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Louisiana railway segregation statute. 9 The Supreme Court restricted
the Thirteenth Amendment to the abolition of slavery, peonage, the coolie
trade, and involuntary servitude.'
Discriminatory treatment failed to
impose a badge of slavery or servitude and the Supreme Court found that
the concept of slavery would be overextended if applied to every act of
55.
(1885)).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. (citing The Sue, 22 F. 843 (1885); Logwood v. Railroad Co., 23 F. 318
See Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 950.
Id. at 950-51 (citing Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884)).
Id. at 951.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1896).
Id. at 542.
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discrimination by private individuals." The Supreme Court focused most
of its analytical attention on whether the railway segregation act violated
the Fourteenth Amendment. 2
The Supreme Court found that enforced separation of the races failed
The Court grappled with the
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.6
same issue that faced the Supreme Court of Louisiana when it focused
most of its attention on explaining the nature and meaning of equality
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court agreed with the
Louisiana high court when they found that legal distinctions between the
races failed to destroy the legal equality of the races. 4 Separation failed
to impose or impact equality, and the races could be required to be
separate and not be unequal. Also like the Louisiana court, the Supreme
Court focused implicitly on the historical context of the Fourteenth
Amendment. School segregation and restrictions on racial intermarriage
provided long-held and widely-accepted examples of legally sanctioned
segregation in the United States.' In addition, the Supreme Court, like
its Louisiana judicial counterpart, utilized the Boston school segregation
case, Roberts v. City of Boston,' as a prime example of the acceptance
of segregation. The Supreme Court also cited to the Ohio,67 New
York,6 8 and Indiana69 cases referenced by the Louisiana high court.
The Indiana case ° involved the validity of a law forbidding racial
intermarriage. The Supreme Court's point in referring to these northern
segregation cases mirrored that made by the Louisiana high court. In
those northern states where the rights of African-Americans had been
traditionally and earnestly enforced, racial segregation had been
recognized by the judiciary as a valid exercise of the legislative power."'
The Supreme Court implicitly established the context for the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment finding that even those northern states that
supported the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment recognized the
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 543-52.
Id. at 548.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.

65. Id. at 544-45.
66. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).

67. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545 (citing State v. McCann, 21 Ohio 198 (1871)).

68. Id. (citing People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883)).
69. Id. (citing Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874)).
70. State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389 (1871).
71. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-45.
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validity of racial segregation and therefore equality under the Fourteenth
Amendment failed to mean integration of the races.
If equality did not mean integration of the races, then the Supreme
Court faced the task of defining the meaning of equality. The Supreme
Court moved away from the thinking of the Louisiana high court when it
analyzed the meaning of equality. The Louisiana court conceptualized
equality as materialistic and mechanistic,' and found that equality existed
so long as equal access to similar facilities existed. 73 The United States
Supreme Court opted for a different analysis. The Supreme Court
mentioned briefly that equal access satisfied constitutional requirements of
equality,74 but spent more of its analytical resources defining Fourteenth
Amendment equality by distinguishing between political and social
equalities.7' In fact, the Supreme Court's implicit discussion concerning
the historical context of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
occurred within the context of the discussion concerning political and
social equalities. 6
The Supreme Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment protected
the African-American's political equality.' The Court focused on the
right of African-Americans to sit on juries, citing Strauder v. West
Virginia, which held that African-Americans could not be excluded from
juries based on their race. 71 Also, once a law accorded AfricanAmericans the right to mingle with whites, that law could not be
overlooked and disregarded.79 Hence, once the political system provided
rights, such rights were inviolable. The Court recognized a public or
civic sphere, where the law required that African-Americans and all
people be treated the same. In that public or civic sphere, law could act.
The Court failed to clarify the makeup or extent of the public or civic
sphere. The Court also created a dichotomy between the public or civic
sphere and private sphere involving social life.
According to the Supreme Court, the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment never intended to enforce social equality.' ° The separation
of the two races in schools, theaters, and railway cars involved social
72. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
73. Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 950-51.
74. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.

75. Id. at 544-46, 549-52.
76. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-45.
77. See id. at 545-46.
78. 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
79. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545-46.

80. See id.at 544.
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choices"1 unenforceable by law and legislation. I Social prejudices and
beliefs could not be legislated or be overcome by legislation.'
The
Supreme Court failed to pinpoint the contours of what constituted
unregulable social life as opposed to regulable political behavior; because
in the Court's view social inequality or equality existed subjectively within
the minds of those who relate to each other. Hence, legally enforced
separation failed to create inequality in any tangible, empirical or
observable manner. If African-Americans believed that legally mandated
segregation stamped their race with a badge of inferiority, such beliefs
existed only because African-Americans chose to conceive of segregation
as unequal.' Law and the psyche remained in separate spheres of life.
Law could require racial separation, but inequality existed only because
of individually held beliefs about inequality. Adjustments in attitudes
could bring about equality even where people could not intermingle.
In addition tQ making a distinction between political and social
equality, the Supreme Court focused on the federalism impact of the
Louisiana railway segregation statute.
The Louisiana high court
mentioned that the regulation of domestic or intrastate commerce remained
exclusively a state function,' but failed to expand upon its point. The
United States Supreme Court extensively distinguished between federal
and state police powers.'
The Court found that the Commerce
Clause' and the Fourteenth Amendment applied only narrowly to state
legislation involving racial segregation. The Louisiana railway segregation
statute fell outside the scope of the Commerce Clause because the statute
applied only to intrastate passengers and travel.'
Hence, federal
legislative and regulatory authority failed to apply. The Supreme Court
also found that the Fourteenth Amendment did not invest Congress with
the power to legislate in areas within the domain of state legislation such
as a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights.8 9 The
Supreme Court avoided tying together analytically its observations
concerning federalism. Overall, the Court concluded that Louisiana and
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. at 545, 551-52.
Id. at 544, 551-52.
See id. at 551.
Id.

85. Exparte Plessy, 11 So. 951.

86. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 546-48.
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
88. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 548.
89. Id. at 546-47 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
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other states possessed a police power unhampered by the United States
Constitution which would allow the races to remain separated.'
Although the United States Supreme Court failed to follow much of
the reasoning of the Louisiana high court, the Court still found the
separate but equal doctrine to be constitutional. Though each court
utilized its own rationale, both the Louisiana and United States Supreme
Courts shared similar social and political theories and assumptions when
deciding Plessy.
III. SOCIAL DARWINISM, DIVINE RACISM, LESS THAN COHERENT

FEDERALISM, ATTrruDiNAL LAISSEZ FAiRE AND
THE CELEBRATION OF DEMOCRACY

The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Louisiana
shared historical views of the segregationist context of the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 91 However, they failed to share views about the
meaning of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment.' Both courts
shared underlying theoretical assumptions about the nature of race, the
quality of individual attitudes, and the dynamics of American democracy.
Overall, the United States Supreme Court expressed underlying
assumptions more explicitly than the Louisiana high court, but neither
expanded upon those assumptions at any length. The Plessy opinions
reflect common visions concerning the relations between white and black
Americans in the late nineteenth century.
A. Nature, Religion, and Race
Both Plessy opinions reflected the seriousness with which racial
differences were taken in the 1890s. Racial instincts and the physical
differences between the races created immutable barriers to legal
remedy.' Natural differences between the races along with custom and
law made legally mandated racial segregation reasonable regulation.' 4
As a result, the Fourteenth Amendment could not defy nature by
abolishing distinctions based upon the color of races.95 The Plessy
opinions based their thinking on assumptions about the strength of the
90. Id. at 548, 550-51.
91. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
93. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
94. Exparte Plessy, 11 So. 948, 950 (La. 1892) (quoting West Chester & P.R.R.,
55 Pa. 209, 213-14 (1867)).
95. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
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natural differences between the white and black races. The distinction
founded in the color of the two races must always exist "so long as white
men are distinguished from the other race by color." 96 The Plessy
opinions implicitly created a dichotomy between human law and the law
of nature; human law remained powerless to change conditions created by
the law of nature.'
The strength of the natural difference between the races found in the
Plessy opinions probably reflected two philosophical views about race
existing at the end of the Nineteenth Century. One can only say
"probably reflected" because the opinions provide very little direct
evidence of broader philosophical insights. Neither Plessy opinion stated
outright that one race was superior or inferior to the other. In fact, the
Louisiana high court wrote, "[t]o assert separateness is not to declare
inferiority . ... "91 The United States Supreme Court evidenced even
greater ambiguity about the social equality of the races when the Court
wrote, "[i]f one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of
the United States cannot put them upon the same plane." 99 However, the
general insistence of both opinions about the natural quality of segregation
implied that something more than skin color differences separated the
races.
The Plessy opinions probably reflected social Darwinism" and
racist theology.1"' Social Darwinism provided a scientific basis for racist
thinking. The concept of survival of the fittest was transformed from a
long-term scientific evolutionary phenomenon to a social phenomenon in
which the white race became the naturally dominant class." AfricanAmericans were viewed as inferior as evidenced by innate traits such as
96. Id. at 543.
97. See id. at 551.
98. Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 950 (quoting West Chester, 55 Pa. at 213).
99. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552.
100. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM INAMERICAN THOUGHT 170200 (1955); Irving G. Hindrich, Stare Decisis, Federalism, and JudicialSelf-Restraint:

ConceptsPerpetuatingthe SeparateBut EqualDoctrine in PublicEducation, 1849-1954,
12 J.L. & EDUC. 561, 569-70 (1983); Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The
Residential Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 301 (1983);
Schmidt, supra note 3, at 453.
101. See JOHN B. BOLES, MASTERS &SLAvES INTHE HOUSE OF THE LORD, RACE
AND RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1740-1870 (John B. Boles ed., 1988);
BENJAMIN QUARLES, THE NEGRO INTHE MAKING OF AMERICA 71, 159-62 (1987); H.
SHELTON SMITH, IN HIS IMAGE, BUT... RACISM INSOUTHERN RELIGION, 1780-1910,
at 208-305 (1972).
102. See MERLE CURTI, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN THOUGHT 652 (3d ed. 1991);
Raymond S. Franklin, SHADOWS OF RACE AND CLASS 45 (1991).
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immorality, criminality, and degeneracy. 0 3 Ultimately, this view held
Certainly, such beliefs could explain
that the black race would die."
the briefly stated certitude about the correctness of miscegenation laws
reflected in the Louisiana"0 5 and United States Supreme Court"°
opinions in Plessy. Miscegenation laws would seem natural and correct
when one race was viewed as inherently inferior or superior to the other.
The state possessed the power to prevent the members of a vibrant race
from marrying members of a dying race.
Racist theology found its roots in theological attitudes toward
slaves" and Anglo-Saxon beliefs about their mission to spread modern
Christianity. 03 One tenet of racial theology is that the Creator placed
blacks under the rule of whites and required blacks to obediently serve
whites." °9 As such, American whites accepted the task of civilizing the
less sophisticated peoples of color."' Thus, there should be no surprise
when the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Plessy stated, "following the
order of Divine Providence, human authority ought not to compel these
widely-separated races to intermix."11
B. Less Than Coherent Federalism
Both Plessy opinions discussed and shared a concern about
federalism."' The Louisiana high court clearly and conclusively stated
that regulation of intrastate commerce remained a state power while the
regulation of interstate commerce remained a federal power." 3 The
Louisiana court also asserted that the regulation of intrastate commerce
constituted a state function as much as public schools and the regulation
103. FRANKLIN, supra note 102, at 46.
104. Power, supra note 100, at 301.

105. See Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 951.
106. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 545.
107. See QUARLES, supra note 101, at 71.
108. See REGINALD HORSMAN, RACE AND MANIFEST DESTINY 81-91 (1981); James
W. Vander Zanden, The Ideology of White Supremacy, in WHrriE RACISM, ITS HISTORY,
PATHOLOGY AND PRACTICES 133-34 (Barry N. Schwartz & Robert Disch eds., 1970).
109. See QUARLES, supra note 101, at 71.
110. See HORSMAN, supra note 108, at 84.

111. Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 950 (quoting West Chester & P.R.R., 55 Pa. 209,
213 (1867)).
112. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.

113. See Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 951.
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of marriage." 4 The United States Supreme Court lacked the directness
and clarity of the Louisiana court, but spent more time and effort
The United States Supreme Court in Plessy
analyzing federalism."
reviewed Hall v. DeCuir,"6 The Civil Rights Cases,"7 and Louisville
v. Mississippi.' Hall and Louisville were Commerce Clause cases, 1 9
while The Civil Rights Cases were Fourteenth Amendment cases. Based
on Hall, the Plessy Court found that a state statute requiring racial
integration on public conveyances could not apply to interstate travel. 20
Based on Louisville, the Plessy Court found that a state statute requiring
separate but equal railway facilities validly regulated travel solely within
the state enacting the statute.121 The Plessy Court utilized The Civil
Rights Cases to state that the Fourteenth Amendment failed to authorize
Congress to create statutes regulating private rights. Instead, the states
possessed the power to regulate private, individual. behavior."
The United States Supreme Court used this jigsaw puzzle analysis of
Hall, Louisville, and The Civil Rights Cases to agree with the
straightforward conclusiveness of the Louisiana high court. The United
States Supreme Court interjected its federalism analysis between a
discussion about the nature of political rights" and a discussion about
whether damages would exist under the Louisiana railway segregation act
if a passenger was assigned to the wrong separate car.' 24 The Court
concluded its federalism discussion by finding that the Louisiana railway
line involved in the Plessy litigation appeared to be a purely local line." z
The Court could have made that conclusion without extended analysis.
Although the Supreme Court utilized a fair amount of judicial effort, it
failed to make the federalism point coherently.
The idea that the state of Louisiana could control its own legal affairs
loomed important to the Louisiana high court and the United States
Supreme Court. Neither court expansively and clearly stated why that
114. Id.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 546-48.
95 U.S. 485 (1877).
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
133 U.S. 587 (1890).
Id. at 589; Hall, 95 U.S. at 487; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 546.
Id. at 54748.
Id. at 54647.

123. Id. at 544-46.
124. Id. at 54849.
125. Id. at 548.
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655"-

should be so. Possibly, Plessy reflected a growing post-Reconstruction
respect for the sovereignty of the southern states." 2 Also possible is
that Plessy evidenced a federal judicial sensitivity to the integrity of state
On the other hand, the federalism
functions and state powers." z
concerns in the Plessy opinions pointed to a broader theme pronounced by
both Plessy courts concerning democracy.
C. Attitudinal Laissez Faire and The Celebration of Democracy
The importance of racial differences between whites and blacks'"2 9
and the inscrutable and less than coherent importance of federalism
in Plessy were merely two elements of a larger and more dominant theme
in the Plessy opinions. The celebration of democratic law-creation
provided the dominant theoretical basis for both Plessy opinions.
In Plessy, both the Louisiana high court and the United States
Supreme Court coped with the natural difference between the races and
the concerns about the powers of the states in the context of a broader
problem. Both courts recognized inherent limits on the law's authority
and effectiveness to change public opinion concerning the races and racial
intermixing. The Louisiana high court and the United States Supreme
Court recognized a strong policy of laissez faire toward social attitudes
and the regulation of relationships. 30 Legislation remained powerless
to change public opinion."' Law failed to create social prejudice,
Enforced
and equally failed to overcome racial attitudes.' 33
commingling of the races would not lead to equal rights"3 and
compelling blacks and whites to associate together would fail to end
prejudice.' 5 In fact, such legally compelled intermixing would intensify
the repulsion and tensions between the races."3 6 For the white and black
races to improve their relations and respect for each other, natural
126. See ERIC

FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,

1863-1877, at 575-601 (1988).

127. Hindrich, supra note 100, at 572-73.
128. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.

129. See supranotes 112-15 and accompanying text.
130. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51; Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 950-51.
131. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
132. Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 950 (citing Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass (5 Cush.)
198 (1849)).

133. 163 U.S. at 551.
134. Id.
135. Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 950.
136. Id. at 951.
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affinities, mutual appreciation and voluntary consent of individuals in
creating relationships must work over a period of time to bring the races
together." 7 If anything, the self respect of each race required that
neither race be thrown together with the other. The pride of one race
would suffer if the other race were legally foisted upon it.'38
Overall, both Plessy courts recognized that law remained powerless
to change public opinion. 9 The relationship between law and public
opinion was the opposite of law fashioning public opinion. Both Plessy
decisions implied that public opinion fashioned law. The courts found that
public opinion made the Louisiana railway segregation law a reasonable
use of legislative powers.' The United States Supreme Court explicitly
found that the Louisiana legislature could determine the reasonableness of
law by referring to "established usages, customs and traditions of the
people."141 The Supreme Court of Louisiana was a little more vague in
its deference to the will of the people when the court found that the
segregation law reflected the public order, peace, and comfort of
Louisiana. 2 The prejudiced opinion of the people, long-held opinion
in many circumstances, created a reasonable and rational basis for
segregationist laws. 3 Both courts viewed prejudice as just another type
of public opinion to which the peoples' representatives in the state and
federal legislatures must respond."'4 So long as the commingling of the
races remained dissatisfactory to public opinion the legislature could only
acquiesce by keeping the races apart. 45
The United States Supreme Court fashioned a model of democracy
that would assure the political as opposed to social equality of both
races."4 Under that model, racial segregation failed to serve as a great
burden for either race because the Supreme Court's model of democracy
guaranteed both races the same access to law creation. The Court found
that should the black race dominate a state legislature, and pass its own set
of segregation statutes, such law creation by black politicians would not
be seen by the white populace as rendering the white populace inferior to
137. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
138. Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 951.
139. Id. at 950; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
140. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550; Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 951.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

163 U.S. at 550.
Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 951.
Id. at 950.
See id. at 950-51; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-45.
Id. at 544-46; see supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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the black populace. 47 The Court based its thinking about the application
of black-sponsored segregation laws to the white populace on its
observations that the black race had been dominant in state legislature in
the past and would likely be dominant politically in the future." 4 The
Court pointed out that a white majority-sponsored railway segregation
statute would not make blacks inferior just as a black-supported railway
statute would not make whites inferior. Even law based on biased public
opinion' 49 was fair so long as everyone possessed an equal opportunity
to legislatively indulge their biases. What mattered to the Supreme Court
was the openness of the political system; the Court implied by its model
that African-Americans would retain the power to translate their popular
beliefs into law in the same way as whites. Under the Supreme Court's
model of democracy, the natural instincts and differences of the races 50
became irrelevant. The Court reasoned that no matter how wide the gulf
between the races became both races could make their attitudes and
opinions matter through the state legislatures.
Democracy and the democratic resolution of conflicts between the
nature of the races and the attitudes of the races became the safest route
to resolve conflicts between the races. So long as everyone had access to
the political arena, everyone had a fair chance to fashion law. Democracy
thereby became a neutral and passive middle ground between the races.
In this intellectual context, the seemingly unfocused concerns of the
Supreme Court about federalism became more understandable.'"' The
domain of state legislative power needed to be preserved,' 2 because the
state legislatures provided the neutral, passive, and open points of
mediation between two naturally different groups of people who possessed
long felt and strongly held biases about each other. Certainly, one place
where natural affinities, mutual appreciation, and voluntary consent could
exist would be state legislatures where whites and blacks were elected by
their respective constituencies. 53
The Plessy decisions celebrated public opinion in the American South.
Biased or prejudicial public opinion became legitimate political rhetoric
147. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
148. Id.
149. Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 950 (citing Roberts v Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.)
198, 209-210 (1849); West Chester & P.R.R., 55 Pa. 209, 215 (1867)).
150. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
152. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 546-47 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883)).
153. See id. at 551.
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and the bases for public policy and law."5 Such public opinion failed
to be unfair to any one race so long as both races possessed equal political
rights"5 5 and access to the legislative system.' 56 The social attitudes of
the South toward separating the races reflected long-held attitudes and
public policy in such northern bastions of civil rights as Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, and New York."5 Democracy in the post-Civil War
South involved both the black and white races.
The Plessy opinions reflected full recognition of the postReconstruction development of political systems in the American
During Reconstruction, the political system was open to
South.'
Both races joined the political system, and the
southern blacks.'
natural differences between them and their conflicting racial belief systems
would be worked out through an open, legislative political system.
However, Plessy actually heralded the renewed domination of southern
whites in the southern states.
IV. THE FAILURES OF THE PLESSY MODEL OF DEMOCRACY:
INTERNAL INCONSISTENCY AND OPPRESSIVE AND
ANTIDEMOCRATIC NATURE OF THE MAJORITY

The model of democracy conceived by the United States Supreme
Court in Plessy failed. " Separate but equal failed to create two
separate societies, one white and the other black, conceived by the United
Plessy also failed
States Supreme Court to be equal before the law.'
to meet its promise that "when the government ... has secured to each
of its citizens equal rights before the law and equal opportunities for
improvement and progress, it has accomplished the end for which it was
Separate but equal relegated the African-American
organized."162
community in the American South to a lower caste. For example,
154. Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 950; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
155. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-46, 551-52.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 551.
Id. at 544-45; Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 950.
See FONER, supra note 126, at 587-601.
Id. at 350-55.
See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.

161. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544, 551.
162. Id. (quoting People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 538, 448 (1883)).
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African-Americans were not accorded the basic rights of citizenship"
and the white community restricted the access of the African-American
community to basic services and resources.'" Psychologically, AfricanAmericans became demeaned by the separateness of separate but
equal."6 Some communities even attempted to create a system of
apartheid in which African-Americans could not live in neighborhoods or
blocks inhabited by whites." 6 African-Americans, especially in rural
areas of the American South, became desperately impoverished. 67 In
many instances, states failed to obey their own laws by neglecting to
provide equal or even somewhat equal separate facilities.' 68 Separate
but equal led to a sixty-year civil rights struggle in which AfricanAmericans fought for basic freedoms long held by white communities. 6 9
The misery and oppression created by the separate but equal legal
structure evidenced the failure of the model of democracy posited by the
Supreme Court in Plessy. The white majority took and maintained
political control, and African-Americans found themselves excluded from
the political system. 70
A. A FailedModel of Democracy: illogic and Inconsistency
The Supreme Court of Louisiana and the United States Supreme Court
committed themselves to a laissez faire approach to the legal regulation of
social attitudes and relations.'
The relationship between the races had
to develop without interference from the law and government. 7 The
163. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. Moss, JR., FROM SLAvERY TO
FREEDOM, A HISTORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS 259-63 (1994); FRED POULEDGE, FREE
AT LAST, THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOvEMENT AND THE PEOPLE WHO MADE IT 3-23 (1991);

WOODWARD, supra note 3, at 9, 67-109.
164. See SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, AFRICAN-AMERICANSAND THE QUEST FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, 1900-1990, at 6-8 (1991); RALPH MCGILL, No PLACE TO HIDE: THE SOUTH
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (1984).
165. See Appendix to Appellant's Brief, at 3-17, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 8) (The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of

Desegregation).
166. See Power, supra note 100.
167. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE CROssWINDS OF FREEDOM 313-16 (1989).
168. See Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952), aft'd, 91 A.2d 137 (Del.
1952).

169.
170.
171.
172.

See generally KLUGER, supra note 4.
See FRANKLIN & Moss, supra note 163, at 259-63.
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551-52.
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law remained powerless to change or eradicate prejudice or any other kind
of public opinion or attitude.173 The law failed as a means of forcing
members of each race to relate to members of the other race. Both courts
implied that public opinion favored the separation of the races, and
validated a scheme of law that required the separation of the races. 74
Ironically, the basic philosophical thinking of both courts conflicted with
the legal result of both Plessy opinions.
Both courts touted a social laissez faire philosophy and analysis, but
the Louisiana railway segregation statute and the separate but equal
doctrine resulted in the opposite of laissez faire social relations. On the
one hand, the law was powerless to force the black and white races to
commingle because it failed to change interpersonal attitudes. 17 On the
other hand, it created a system that structured the relations between the
races and forced upon both races an attitude of separateness. The
Louisiana railway segregation act required that railways separate the races
even when railway personnel desired a mix of races in their rail
coaches. 176 An inconsistency and illogic existed because the law was
powerless to require integration and promote integrationist attitudes, but
possessed the power to force segregationist behavior and promote
segregationist attitudes.
The illogic and inconsistency between a laissez faire approach to
integration and a statist approach to segregation created an inherent
unfairness and inequality for those in both races who wanted to
commingle. In Plessy, the Supreme Court indicated that relations between
the races would develop as a result of natural affinities, mutual
appreciation and voluntary consent of individuals. 17 The separate but
equal doctrine hampered the development of natural affinities and
voluntary consent because the law backed by state prosecutorial authority,
such as the penalties in the Louisiana railway segregation law, penalized
those of each race who tried to meet each other in public settings. 78
Therefore, whites and blacks who desired integration were forced to fight
against the legal system before they even possessed the opportunity to
commingle publicly.' 79 Accordingly, laissez faire seemed to run only
173. See Exparte Plessy, 11 So. 948, 950 (La. 1892).

174. Id. at 950-51; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
175. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
176. Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 949.
177. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
178. See Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 949.
179. See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 7, at 128-32 (discussing the birth of the
Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott); Whittington B. Johnson, The VirgilHawkins Case:
A NearDecade of Evading the Inevitable: The Demise of Jim Crow Higher Education in
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one way, protecting white segregationist attitudes from the heavy hand of
the law. 110
The Plessy courts missed the opportunity to apply social relations
laissez faire in a logical and consistent manner. To assure consistency,
not only should the Louisiana high court and United States Supreme Court
have invalidated statutes requiringintermingling by members of each race,
but both courts should have invalidated the Louisiana railway segregation
statute for forbidding intermingling. Whites and blacks could not be
legally required to relate or not to relate. Unfortunately, both courts
constitutionally legitimatized an unfair and unequal system and white
America responded to the new segregationist constitutionality. As a
result, the Plessy model of open democracy for both races crumbled.
B. The End of the Ultimate Hope for Social Change:
Disenfranchisement and the Creation
of Selective Lawlessness
The illogic and inconsistency of the Plessy model of democracy
weighted the political system against African-Americans. Laissez faire
social relations favoring segregationist policies validated racism as a
political philosophy. The subtle philosophical validation by the United
States Supreme Court in Plessy of a one-sided, white-race-dominated
political scheme undermined the Supreme Court's commitment to political
equality.8 Plessy championed the democratic, legislative creation of
law,'" but the Supreme Court by its support of a one-sided laissez faire
philosophy failed to favor the racially open system of legislative
representation that eventually could have allowed African-Americans to
amend segregationist law."
The dominant public policy of separatebut-equal protected the white race as the superior class of citizens, 1 4
and segregationist law such as anti-miscegenation statutes pandered to
popular white prejudices." 8
Florida, 16 S.U. L. REV. 55 (1989).
180.
181.
182.
1937, 46
183.

See State v. Board of Control, 83 So. 2d 20, 24-25 (Fla. 1955).
See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-46, 551-52.
Id. at 550-51; see Richard A. Epstein, Race and the Police Power: 1890 to
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 741, 746 (1989).
See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.

184. Donald E. Lively, Separate But Equal: The Low Road Reconsidered, 14
L.Q. 43, 66-67 (1986).
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185. Comment, Intermarriagewith Negroes-A Survey of State Statutes, 36 YALE

L.J. 858, 860-61 (1927).
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The white race exploited its constitutionally legitimated position as the
superior citizens, which crushed all hope of attaining the Supreme Court's
racially equal and open model of democracy. White America, especially
in the southern states, disenfranchised African-Americans, which made it
nearly impossible for African-Americans to play roles in creating public
policy and law.' 86 A number of southern states enacted poll taxes
requiring that poll tax receipts be presented before allowing citizens to
vote. The poll tax scheme erected inconvenient procedures for registering
to vote."n Like the separate but equal doctrine, the Supreme Court
constitutionally validated the poll tax.' 8 White primaries prevented
African-Americans from casting the most meaningful vote available in
regions where one party dominated.' 89 The southern states resisted
constitutional challenges to the white primaries for almost three
decades.'" Often, local election officials refused to register AfricanAmericans to vote in primaries. 9 ' Probably, the most effective means
of barring African-American voters were the grandfather clauses included
in southern state constitutions which only allowed voters to register when
their fathers and grandfathers had been eligible to vote.' 2 Thus
grandfather clauses prevented large numbers of African-Americans from
joining the voter rolls."9
The disenfranchisement of African-Americans, especially in the
southern states, symbolized the outcast position of African-Americans in
the social and legal systems. The ideal of Plessy failed. Separation of the
races did not result in political equality. Instead, racial separation based
on illogical and inconsistent social laissez faire philosophy resulted in
186. See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 134-45

(1980); Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principleand Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race

in the ProgressiveEra. Part3: Black Disfranchisementfrom the KKK to the Grandfather
Clause, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 835, 842-47 (1982).

187. See BELL, supra note 186, at 142-43.
188. See Breedlove v. Shuttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), overruled by Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).

189. See BELL, supra note 186, at 140-42.
190. See, e.g., Terryv. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649 (1944); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
191. See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 55 (upholding the constitutionality of

the racially restrictive membership policy of the Texas Democratic party which
effectively barred African-American participation in primary elections in that state);
Nancy K. Bannon, The Voting Rights Act: Over the Hill at Age 30, 22 HuM. RTs. 10,

11 (1995); Note, Legal Realism and the Race Question: Some Realism About Realism

on Race Relations, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1607, 1611 (1995).
192. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 163, at 260-61.

193. See id. at 261.
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white supremacy and black denigration. 194 Disenfranchised AfricanAmericans provided a tragic example of how the lack of power to make
law through democratic representation results in the failure of law to
protect basic rights. African-Americans became dispossessed by a legal
system that excluded their policy choices.
Mob violence'95 and
lynching' 96 victimized African-Americans during the decades after
Plessy. African-Americans lacked the power to reform the law through
democratic representation; the law treated them as nearly invisible and as
play toys."7
White America as a majority commandeered and dominated the
legislative, democratic lawmaking system. The majority froze out the
African-American minority, and the hope of the United States Supreme
Court in Plessy that African-Americans would have equal legislative
representation faded fast. 9
A racist majority bolstered by the
constitutional validation of a one-sided social laissez faire philosophy
encouraging racial separation exploited their power position. The white
majority did not find satisfaction in merely constituting a democratic
majority that organized and shaped a political agenda.' 9 Instead, the
white majority excluded the African-American minority from even a
symbolic presence in the democratic, legislative lawmaking process.2
Democratic lawmaking lost its universality which resulted in the
oppression of a minority.
Democratic lawmaking provided no
opportunities for the excluded minority to end or even mitigate the
oppression.

194. See Aldon Morris, Centuries of Black Protest: Its Significancefor America
and the World, in RACE INAMERICA, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 40-43 (Herbert Hill
& James E. Jones, Jr., eds., 1993).
195. See ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING,
1909-1950, at 22-50 (1980).
196. See MICHAEL NEWTON & JUDY ANN NEWTON, RACIAL & RELIGIOUS
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: A CHRONOLOGY 284-430 (1991) (detailing instances of lynching
during the era between Plessy and Brown); ZANGRANDO, supra note 195, at 5-8;
Schmidt, supra note 3, at 454-55.
197. See PETER R. TEACHOUT, LOUISIANA UNDERLAW, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE 57-

60 (Leon Friedman, ed., 1965).
198. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
199. See GUINIER, supra note 9, at 4, 49-50.
200. See id. at 50; WOODWARD, supra note 3, at 83-84.
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V. THE REMEDY FOR FAILED DEMOCRATIC LAWMAKING:
ELITE AND NEUTRAL ANTI-DEMOCRACIES

The separate but equal doctrine led to the failure of American
democracy because the white majority excluded the African-American
minority completely from legislative, democratic lawmaking. The white
majority maintained its exclusive franchise on lawmaking in the American
South and African-Americans possessed no democratic power to end or
ameliorate separatist oppression. 2° 1 Change could not come from
political activism.'
As a result, the status quo had the force of law
behind it.'
Constitutional litigation became the means and hope for
softening the rigors of racial separatism.' ° By the 1940s and 1950s, it
became abundantly clear that the status quo nature of the law and the
exclusive white-dominated lawmaking system could not be used to bring

about the natural affinities between the races mentioned by the United
States Supreme Court in Plessy.
Separatist law blocked racial
interaction and African-Americans possessed little or no opportunities
to amend separatist law.'0

Where democracy provided no hope for change in the law, a limited
number of alternative means of change existed.

Street protests and

boycotts provided one option in which an unrepresented community
challenged authority directly and attempted to mobilize public opinion to
fashion change. 0 8 Acceptance of oppression represented a second
201. See BELL, supra note 186, at 145-47; WOODWARD, supra note 3, at 141-42.
202. See BRANCH, supra note 7, at 143-205 (describing the Montgomery, Alabama
bus boycott, which provided a good example of the non-democratic, legislative means
that African-Americans utilized to change either law or the application of law).
203. See State v. Board of Control, 47 So. 2d 608, 615 (Fla. 1950).
204. See generallyKLUGER, supra note 4, at 53 (stating that "the job of reconciling
the country's new moral and constitutional commitment to the Negro with its undiluted
distastes for him as a human being fell to that esteemed borker of national disputes, the
Supreme Court of the United States").
205. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
206. See, e.g., BRANCH, supra note 7, at 289-90 (discussing a school that was
raided by police officers and described by prosecutors as an "integrated whorehouse");
see Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908) (upholding the constitutionality of
a state statute permitting seperate education by an incorporated college).
207. See BURNS, supra note 167, at 320-21 (describing how civil rights laws were
blocked for decades by the United States Congress).
208. See BRANCH, supra note 7, at 143-205, 412-91; Walker v. City of
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (holding that a state may properly enjoin persons from
participating in or encouraging mass street parades without a permit as required by a city
ordinance).
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option, though one that seemed difficult to accept in a progressive and
open democracy.'
The United States Supreme Court chose to break
the legal lockhold of unending separate but equal law with anti-democracy.
Anti-democracy involved discounting and nullifying democratically
created and maintained law which retained popular support. Antidemocracy represented more than just the constitutional invalidation of a
popular or majority favored law such as a regulation requiring that public
school students salute the flag. 210 Anti-democracy restricted democratic
lawmaking relating to a discreet and defined area of human behavior for
an extended period of time. Economic decision making and contractual
relations provided an early twentieth century example of behavior
protected by anti-democracy, 2 ' which was later discredited for
frustrating the popular will.2" 2 To combat the oppressive results of
Plessy's illogical and inconsistent social relations laissez faire,2t 3 the
United States Supreme Court applied two types of anti-democracy, elitist
and neutral.
A. Elitist Anti-democracy: Fighting Fire with Fire
Elitist anti-democracy involved the use of a narrowly focused and
countervailing set of social values to combat popular social values
underpinning democratically created law. The United States Supreme
Court in Brown v. Board of Education214 began to dismantle the separate
but equal scheme of law by applying elitist anti-democracy. In Brown,
African-American school children challenged state law that segregated
schools as violating equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment.2 5 The Court held that separate but equal doctrine had no
place in public education, finding that racially separated educational
facilities were inherently unequal. 2 6' The Brown Court found itself
coping with two rationales of the Plessy Court that provided the basis for
209. See Morris, supra note 194.
210. See West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

211. See Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926); Adams v. Tanner, 244

U.S. 590 (1917); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208
U.S. 161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
212. See Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and The Eight-HourDay, 21 HARV.

L. REv. 495, 508-9 (1908); Charles Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 39 HARv. L. REV. 431, 464 (1926).
213. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
214. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

215. Id. at 487-88.
216. Id. at 495.
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constitutional separate but equal doctrine. First, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana and the United States Supreme Court in Plessy found that
separate but equal doctrine curried support in the northern states that
favored the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.2t 7 Such extensive
acceptance of separate but equal doctrine implied that the authors of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not intend equality to require racial
integration. So long as both races were treated equally in their separation,
the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated.21 8
The Brown Court failed to discover a way out of the Louisiana
Court's and the Supreme Court's historical analysis. Instead, the Brown
Court sidestepped the issue by finding that Fourteenth Amendment
historical documentation was inconclusive concerning the acceptability of
racial segregation at the time the Amendment was enacted. 2 9 Second,
the Brown Court expanded the definition of equality accepted by the
Louisiana and federal high courts in Plessy. The Louisiana high court
defined equality in materialistic and mechanistic terms by finding that so
long as both races had access to similar facilities and the laws were
applied similarly to both races, equality existed. The fact that people felt
unequal remained irrelevant so long as their facilities and the law
In contrast, the United
enforcement involving them were equal.'
States Supreme Court in Plessy viewed equality in narrow political terms
as opposed to social ones. As long as both races were accorded political
That people
equality, the Fourteenth Amendment was not violated. "
felt unequal due to separation was irrelevant so long as government treated
The Brown Court expanded the meaning of equality
them similarly.'
to include more than tangible factors such as similar school buildings,
In avoiding a historical analysis and
curricula and teacher salaries.'
expanding the concept of equality to include more than tangible similarity,
the Brown Court latched onto a specialized set of social values
representative of the mid-twentieth century.
The Brown Court found that African-American children were treated
unequally even when provided similar school houses and curricula. To
reach this conclusion the Brown Court turned away from the social
217. Exparte Plessy, 11 So. 948, 950 (La. 1892); Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-45; see
supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
218. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51.
219. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
220. Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 950.
221. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-46.
222. Id. at 551.
223. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
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Darwinian, theological and laissez faire thinking underlying Plessy.24
Instead, the Court adopted a modernist view of the value and role of
education in contemporary American society'
and a psychological
analysis of how African-American children suffered in segregated
classrooms.'
The Supreme Court found that education constituted a
core value of modern America. Not only was education the most
important function of state and local governments, but education formed
the foundation of good citizenship, cultural values, professional training
and psychological adjustment.'
Unless children possessed the
opportunity for an education, they could not reasonably be expected to
succeed in life.'
The Brown Court not only focused on education as a basis for the
psychological well being of America's future leaders, the Court utilized
psychology more directly to determine that segregation injured children.
Separating African-American children from their white counterparts
created in African-American children a feeling of inferiority concerning
their status in the community. 9
The Brown Court found that
segregation tended to retard the mental and educational development of
African-American children,"o even citing to psychological treatises for
support.' 3l
The Brown Court found that African-American children were not
being treated equally when segregated even where their school buildings
and curricula were the same as those of white students because the
psychological and educational impact of segregated classrooms fell more
negatively on African-American children than on white children. A deep
respect for the value of education in determining the quality of life and an
appreciation of psychodynamics created the social values context for the
Brown Court. On the basis of respect for education and psychodynamics
the Court limited American state legislatures and the public opinion that
motivated state legislatures from maintaining a form of social regulation
that had existed in schools for over one-hundred years. 3" The elitist
nature of the Brown Court's views were not apparent on the face of the
opinion, but the response to the opinion evidenced popular dissatisfaction.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See supra notes 100-30 and accompanying text.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id. at 494.
Id. (referring to Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)).
Id. at 494 n.11.
See, e.g., Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
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Apparently, many white southerners failed to share the Brown Court's
appreciation of the value of education and psychodynamics.
The response to Brown in the American South included outright
opposition and defiance by political leaders. 3 In fact, many state and
local leaders politically could not avoid opposing and even defying the
Even jurists protested
Court's decision to end segregation in schools.'
the anti-democratic nature of Brown which defied traditional moral, social,
cultural and educational values. 5 Forced integration was viewed as a
Brown ended the popular, legislatively
challenge to majority views."
mandated separation of black and white children in the educational context
that had been recognized by the Plessy Court as existing as early as the
mid-nineteenth century? 7 Elitist social views on the value of education
and psychodynamics began the dissolution of a whole set of segregationist
law. However, the Supreme Court later utilized an alternative type of
anti-democracy to defeat another aspect of segregation.
B. Neutral Anti-Democracy: Limiting the State
and Recognizing Liberty
When faced with determining the constitutionality of an antimiscegenation statute, the United States Supreme Court turned away from
social, scientific and educational values and analytical assumptions a 8
Instead, the Court applied neutral anti-democracy in which certain types
of popularly supported, legislatively and democratically created law simply
could not exist. No underlying religious, social scientific, or other values
nieeded to provide a rationale for the illegitimacy of the law, except that
certain law unto itself was unacceptable for vague traditional reasons.
Neutral anti-democracy involved the Supreme Court in delineating sets of
human behavior which legislative, democratically created law failed to
regulate or control.
The Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia 9 held that the Virginia
anti-miscegenation statute violated equal protection and due process
Loving involved a
guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment. 2'
233. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
234. Crump, supra note 8, at 762-63.
235. See State v. Board of Control, 93 So. 2d 354, 361-62 (Fla. 1957) (Terrel,
C.J., concurring).

236. Id. at 361.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-45.
See supra notes 163-76 and accompanying text.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 12.
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criminal prosecution of an interracial couple under statutes that forbade
Virginians from leaving the state in order to marry interracially. 241
After facing grand jury indictment, the interracial couple pleaded guilty,
but later made a motion to the trial court to vacate their convictions.
When the trial court refused to do so, the couple appealed unsuccessfully
to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 42 The couple eventually
appealed to the United States Supreme Court.243
In Loving, the Supreme Court faced the same historical problem that
it had faced in Brown. The Plessy historical view of the passage of the
In
Fourteenth Amendment continued to elude the Supreme Court.2'
Plessy, both the Supreme Court of Louisiana and the United States
Supreme Court observed that the United States had a long tradition of
forbidding interracial marriage. Both courts implied that the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted and implemented within that context and failed
to change the traditional acceptance of anti-miscegenation laws.245 The
Loving Court followed Brown when finding that the history of the
Fourteenth. Amendment remained ambiguous in reference to antimiscegenation laws. 2' However, the Loving Court failed to analyze the
impact of anti-miscegenation laws on the quality of life of AfricanAmericans as the Supreme Court had done when considering segregated
classrooms in Brown.247
The Loving Court utilized a much simpler and more straight forward
analysis than did the Brown Court. The Loving Court simply found that
the Fourteenth Amendment restricted the democratic creation of law
relative to race24 and the decision to marry.249 Having already found
that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment was ambiguous," 0 the
Court went on to find that "[tjhe clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of
invidious racial discrimination in the states, " " i.e., the Fourteenth
Amendment eliminated racial discrimination as a permissible state
241. Id. at 4.
242. Id. at 3.
243. Id. at 4.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-45; Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 950-51.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 9.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493-94.
Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12.

249. Id. at 12.
250. Id. at 9.
at 10.
251. Id.
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The Loving Court also found that the Fourteenth
objective.52
Amendment guaranteed the freedom to marry. 3 The Court provided
a very vague historical justification when it stated, "[t]he freedom to
marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to orderly pursuit of happiness by freemen. "' Essentially, the
Loving Court created two areas of life, racial and marital relations, which
democratically created law could not regulate no matter how popular the
regulation. The state legislatures became powerless to mandate that
people discriminate racially or otherwise in choosing a marital partner and
in dating and socializing even on an informal, neighborly basis.
The Loving Court provided very little rationale. Unlike the Brown
Court, it did not rely on social scientific thinking or educational values for
underlying assumptions and theories. Unlike the Louisiana and United
States Supreme Court opinions in Plessy, the Loving opinion did not refute
The
Social Darwinism, theology, federalism, or laissez faire theories.'
Loving Court avoided the opportunity to base its decision on social and
hard scientific theories. The Commonwealth of Virginia defended its antimiscegenation statute by arguing that the statute punished members of both
races equally 6 and that a rational basis existed for Virginia to treat
interracial marriages differently from other marriages 357 Virginia
argued that anthropological and biological evidence conflicted and failed
to indicate clearly whether miscegenation was or was not harmful5 8
Virginia focused on a psychological and sociological study indicating that
interracial marriage created marital stress for those who chose it. 9 The
Lovings, in their brief, continued the analysis by saying, "there is not a
single anthropologist teaching at a major university in the United States
who subscribes to the theory that negro-white matings cause biologically
deleterious results. "I
The Loving Court avoided embroiling itself in biological,
anthropological, sociological or psychological theoretical dueling. As a
result, the Court shied away from defining underlying social values,
252. Id. at 11.
253. Id. at 12.
254. Id.
255. See supra notes 91-159 and accompanying text.
256. Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-8.
257. Id. at 8.
258. Brief on Behalf of Appellee at 40-50, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(No. 395).
259. Id. at 47-48.

260. Brief on Behalf of Appellants at 36-37, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(No. 395).
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popular or elitist, that bolstered the Court's thinking. Instead, the Loving
Court utilized a much simpler approach when it recognized zones of racial
relational and marital freedom into which no legislature could enter
without a compelling reason. 1 The Loving Court, like the Brown
Court, implicitly recognized the inherent risks of democratically created
law regulating social relations and choices. However, the Loving Court,
unlike the Brown Court, developed social value neutral zones protected
from popular whims and desires. Neither religion, philosophy, nor
science could influence law in reference to behavior that fell within the
social value neutral zones because little law could exist to regulate that
behavior.
VI. ONE HUNDRED YEARS AFTER PLESSY: THE TRIUMPH
OF ELIrIsT ANTI-DEMOCRACY

Almost one hundred years after the Supreme Court in Plessy
conceived of a racially open and equal model for democratic lawmaking,
the Court employed elitist anti-democracy to threaten increased AfricanAmerican representation in legislatures, specifically the United States
Congress. In Shaw v. Reno, the Court utilized the elitist anti-democracy
employed by the Brown Court in 1954 to question the validity of
predominantly African-American election districts.62 Shaw involved the
redistricting of United States congressional districts in North Carolina after
the 1990 census. In that case, the North Carolina General Assembly
responded to an objection by the United States Attorney General under the
Voting Rights Act of 1965m to the General Assembly's original
redistricting plan by creating a second African-American dominated
congressional district.6 The newly created district stretched snake-like
along interstate highway 1-85. Often the district was no wider than the
width of 1-85.16 Residents of North Carolina brought a claim in United
261. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
262. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); see also Emily Calhoun, Shaw v. Reno: On the
Borderline, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 137 (1993); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi,
Expressive Harms, "BizarreDistricts", and Voting Rights: EvaluatingElection-District

Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 483 (1993); N. Jay Shepherd,
Note, "Abridge" Too Far: RacialGerrymandering,The Fifteenth Amendment, and Shaw
v. Reno, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 337 (1994).

263. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819-20; see Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89110, 79 Stat. 438, 439 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1988)).
264. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819-20.
265. Id. at 2820-21.
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States District Court alleging that the new district violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by creating a racial gerrymander.'
In Shaw, the Supreme Court held that plaintiff North Carolina
residents stated a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. 7
The plaintiffs had alleged that legislation which created the majority
African-American congressional district, though race-neutral on its face,
could not be rationally understood as anything other than creating voting
districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification. 68 The
Supreme Court made it more difficult for state legislatures to remedy past
discrimination in political representation by fashioning irregularly mapped
and widely dispersed congressional or other voting districts for racial
representation purposes.2

9

In 1995, the Supreme Court applied the rationale and doctrine of Shaw
to Georgia's congressional redistricting in Miller v. Johnson.' In the
early 1990s, the Georgia General Assembly's proposed congressional
redistricting plan failed to obtain United States Justice Department
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act." The Justice Department
refused preclearance because the Georgia General Assembly failed to
In
create a third African-American majority congressional district.'
response to pressure from the Justice Department,2' the Georgia
General Assembly created a congressional district that connected AfricanAmerican neighborhoods in inland Atlanta with African-American
neighborhoods 260 miles away in coastal Savannah. The AfricanAmerican urban populations were connected by hundreds of miles of
narrow rural and swampy land corridors. 4 The Supreme Court
accepted a United States District Court finding that race was the
predominant factor motivating the creation of the geographically dispersed
266. Id. at 2821.
267. Id. at 2828 (remanding to the District Court). The District Court subsequently
found the redistricting valid because North Carolina had a compelling state interest to
comply with the Voting Rights Act. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
268. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828.
269. Id. at 2819-20. See generally GUINIER, supra note 9 (discussing the history
of Black America's struggle against tyrannical majority-rule voting schemes and
advocating a system of democracy in which those in power allow the minority to
influence decisionmaking).
270. 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2483 (1995).
271. Id. at 2483-84.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 2484.
274. Id.
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African-American majority congressional district, 5 and held the
redistricting as undermining the Fourteenth Amendment and was beyond
the scope of the Voting Rights Act. 6
Shaw and Miller are examples of cases where democratic lawmaking
was frustrated by anti-democracy in remedying the past discrimination that
evolved from the glorification of racist democratic lawmaking by the
Plessy court. Two other such cases are Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.'
and United States v. Fordice.278
The Shaw and Miller Courts frustrated democratic lawmaking attempts
to remedy racist inequality because both opinions in the tradition of the
Brown Court's elitist anti-democracy favored certain, focused social values
that were not necessarily favored by the population at large. The Shaw
and Miller Courts utilized political theory about the ideal nature of
American democracy as the basis of their analyses. Much like the Plessy
Court that constructed an ideal model of separate but equal democratic
representation, 9 the Shaw and Miller Courts implicitly constructed a
model of democracy that was close to color blind. Both Courts found that
the Constitution sought to weld together a unified community out of the
many multiracial, multireligious communities in American society.'
According to the Shaw Court, American society continues to progress
275. Id. at 2488.
276. Id. at 2491.
277. 488 U.S. 469 (1988) (invalidating a minority set-aside program created by the
Richmond, Virginia, City Council for city-awarded construction contracts). See
generally David Kairys, Race Trilogy, 67 TEMPLE L.Q. 1 (1994); Stephen A. Plass,
JudicialVersusLegislative Chartingof NationalEconomicPolicy: Plottinga Democratic
Coursefor Minority Entrepreneurs, 24 LOY. L.A. L. Rev. 655 (1991); Nina Farber,
Comment, Justifying Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson: The
Court Needs a Standardfor Proving Past Discrimination, 56 BRoOK. L. REv. 975
(1990); Lori Jayne Hoffman, Note, Fatalin Fact: An Analysis of the Application of the
Compelling Governmental Interest Leg of Strict Scrutiny in City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 70 B.U. L. REV. 889 (1990).
278. 112 S. Ct. 2727,2743 (1992) (finding that a dual-race higher education system
in Mississippi violated the Fourteenth Amendment and rejecting a request by private
petitioners to order that predominantly African-American state universities be upgraded
in order to remain exclusively black enclaves). See generally Lome Fienberg, United
States v. Fordice and the Desegregationof Public HigherEducation: Gropingfor Root
and Branch, 34 B.C. L. REV. 803 (1993); Symposium Issue, 62 Miss. L.J. 259 (1993)
(issues dedicated to articles dealing with United States v. Fordice).
279. See supranotes 130-62 and accompanying text.
280. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 66-67
(1964)). Accord Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2494.
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The Shaw and Miller Courts
toward a multiracial democracy."'
maintain that racial, religious, and ethnic political allegiances remain
divisive, and the only political unit that matters in modern America is the
individual citizen-voter. 2 Facilitating representation of racial interests
Elected
could create political apartheid and racial stereotyping.'
officials should avoid representing particular racial groups and should
represent constituencies as a whole.' 4 Americans must avoid racial
balkanization."
The Shaw and Miller Courts lectured all Americans including AfricanAmericans that they must avoid thinking politically in racial contexts. The
Supreme Court never seemed to care that African-Americans and other
communities might hold common interests that should be represented in
the democratic lawmaking processes. It was as if the Court aimed to strip
all Americans of the power to determine who they want to represent
whatever interests they want represented. The Shaw and Miller Courts
indulged themselves in political model building much like the Brown Court
indulged itself in psycho-social model building. In building its theoretical
model, the Supreme Court in Shaw and Miller avoided the Loving Court's
neutrality. Like the Loving Court, the modem Supreme Court could have
voided the North Carolina reapportionment plan by just stating that
legislative decisionmaking based on race was illegitimate. Like the Loving
Court, the Shaw and Miller Courts could have implied that democratic
lawmaking that involved racial classifications, even subtle or unstated,
risked leading to the racist oppression that resulted after Plessy.
VII. SHAW's HISTORICAL IRONY AND PLESSy'S NINETEENTH CENTURY
LESSON FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Shaw and Miller created a historical irony when analyzed in the
context of Plessy. The Shaw and Miller Courts utilized a political model
consisting of a racially unified political systems 6 to frustrate democratic
lawmaking that sought to give greater participation by racial minorities in
democratic lawmaking. The Shaw and Miller Courts definitely turned
away from the United States Supreme Court's implicit model in Plessy of
281. Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2827 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614 (1991)).
282. See id. at 2827 (quoting Wright, 376 U.S. at 66-67); Miller, 115 S. Ct. at
2486.

283.
284.
285.
286.

See
See
See
See

Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2827; Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2486.
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828; Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2486.
Shaw, 113 S.Ct. at 2832; Miller, 115 S.Ct. at 2486.
supra notes 262-85 and accompanying text.
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an open racial democracy in which the democratic process governed. The
Plessy Court implicitly conceived of racial block voting in the context of
a separate but equal social system.'
The Shaw and Miller Courts
spurned the concept of racial bloc voting, instead conceiving of the ideal
American democracy as basing political representation on individual and
general community interests.'
The historical irony is that the impact
of Shaw and Miller and other recent Supreme Court cases such as Croson
and Fordice parallels the socially, politically, and economically negative
impact of Plessy.289 Weakening the electoral expression of racial block
voting closes an important avenue for African-Americans and other racial
minorities to gain access to democratic lawmaking. The political
philosophy of the Shaw and Miller Courts will undermine the legislatures
as important places where, using the terms of the Plessy Court, "the two
races meet upon terms of social equality."2'
The historical ironies of Shaw and Miller evidence, at least facially,
the weakness of both elitist anti-democracy and neutral anti-democracy.
Under both types of anti-democracy, the results of Shaw and Miller and
other recent cases such as Croson and Fordicewould have been the same.
Democratic lawmaking that favored discrete racial interests such as
predominately African-American congressional districts or minority set
asides would fail under a neutral anti-democracy analysis that barred any
race-conscious laws because such laws historically resulted in racial
oppression and even less access to legislative power for racial minorities.
However, that the results of both anti-democracy analyses would have
been the same in Shaw and Miller should not be determinative in
condemning both types of anti-democracy equally. On the contrary, the
broader impact of neutral anti-democracy differs radically from that of
elitist anti-democracy.
Elitist anti-democracy creates a weak analytical framework for
protecting human rights over the long run. It depends on the social values
of the moment and which remain fleeting and inconsistent. Over a one
287. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
288. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827-28, 2832; Miller, 115 S. Ct. 2475.

289. See Wright, supra note 8, at 21-27. See generally Rodney J. Blackman,
Returning to Plessy, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 767 (1992); Kay Ann Hoogland and Condon

McGlotheen, City of Richmond v. Croson: A Set Backfor Minority Set Aside Programs,
15 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 5 (1989); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk and United

States v. Fordice: Why IntegrationismFailsAfrican-AmericansAgain, 81 CAL. L. REv.
1401 (1993); Martin J. Katz, The Economics of Discrimination:The Three Fallacies of
Croson, 100 YALE L.J. 1033 (1991).
290. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
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hundred year period, Social Darwinism,29 federalism, 2' theology,2"
laissez faire philosophy, 294 psychology,2 95 anthropology, 2 96
sociology, 2' biology29 and political theory299 have been utilized to
rationalize the democratic creation of law or restrictions on the democratic

creation of law in the context of race relations.

Shaw and Miller

demonstrate the potential for variable results when utilizing elitist anti-

democracy thinking.

The Supreme Court in Shaw and Miller chose a

political model that valued non-racial, individualized and community-wide
decisionmaking. The Shaw and Miller Courts could have just as easily
adopted a modernized version of the Supreme Court's model in Plessy in

which political equality came when races mobilized to gain their share of

representation.: °
The potential variability of Shaw and Miller, and any other case
decided on the basis of elitist anti-democracy, highlights the bankruptcy
of elitist anti-democracy. Elitist anti-democracy fails to differ substantially
from democratic lawmaking. Plessy, Brown, Shaw and Miller reflect
social values of the moment.3"' The difference between democratic
lawmaking in Plessy and anti-democracy in Brown and Shaw is not a great
one. All reflect social values. However, democratic lawmaking reflects
widely held popular values and elitist anti-democracy reflects the mindset
of a particular set of jurists on a court and those groups such as the
291. See Hindrich, supra note 100, at 569-70; Schmidt, supra note 3, at 453;
Power, supra note 100, at 301.
292. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 546-48; Ex parte Plessy, 11 So. at 951.
293. Exparte Plessy, 11 So. at 950 (citing West Chester & P.R.R. v. Miles, 55 Pa.
209 (1867)).
294. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551.
295. See Appendix to Appellant's Brief, at 3-11, Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 8).
296. See Brief on Behalf of Appellants, at 37, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (No. 395).
297. See Appendix to Appellant's Brief, at 12-17, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 8).
298. See Brief on Behalf of Appellee, at 41-42, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (No. 395) (construing Perez v. Lippold, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948)).
299. See Shaw, 113 S.Ct at 2827-28, 2832.

300. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND rrs CRITIcs 260 (1989). "With the
admission of southern blacks to political life in the 1960s, after bitter and often violent
conflicts, blacks formed the most homogeneous voting bloc in the country." Id.; see also
GUINIER,

supra note 9, at 45-46.

301. See, e.g., Daniel R. Gordon, Happy Anniversary Brown v. Board of
Education, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 107, 116 (1993).
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psychologists in Brown who influence those jurists. 3" Ironically, the
variability of the elitist model allows jurists to choose widely held populist
beliefs as the underlying assumptions for their constitutional analyses. 3
Neutral anti-democracy differs from elitist anti-democracy by being
more enduring. Neutral anti-democracy requires that certain areas of
human behavior remain unregulated by democratic law creation because
the people's representatives and the people who are represented lack the
will and discipline to remain fair and unbiased. Certainly, the decades
after Plessy demonstrate the suffering, inequity and injustice created by the
separate but equal statutory scheme. 3" At the same time, neutral antidemocracy guards against the momentary intellectual predispositions of the
judiciary. Neutral anti-democracy requires that the courts follow the lead
of the Loving Court by delineating areas of human behavior beyond
regulation of the police powers of the legislatures because the American
constitutional framework recognizes certain personal freedoms such as
choosing a mate or relating to people of another race. 5
VIII.

CONCLUSION: PLEssY LESSONS FROM THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The United States Supreme Court faces a dilemma as the twenty-first
century approaches. The Shaw case demonstrates the weakness of elitist
anti-democracy, and there are those who urge the Court to avoid any type
of anti-democracy." ° Certainly, African-Americans and other racial
minorities may agree after Shaw, Miller, Croson, and Fordice. The
arguments for avoiding elitist anti-democracy remain sound. However,
democratic law creation continues to place human and minority rights at
risk.3 07 The lessons from Plessy concerning the oppressive nature of
democratic law creation involving social relations and personal choices
302. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 n.1l (1954).

303. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). But see id. at 205-6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
304. See WOODWARD, supra note 3, at 67-109.
305. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
306. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK, THE IMPOvERIsHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 6-7 (1991); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109
S. Ct. 3040, 3058 (1989).
307. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. H, § 9 (making English the official language of

the State of Florida). See also Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Law-Making Is Not
"Republican Government:" The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19
(1993).
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continue to be relevant as the twenty-first century approaches.308 The
best, though imperfect choice for the Supreme Court seems to be neutral
anti-democracy which assures that social relational choices such as
marriage and whom to befriend at a public school will remain free from
the interference of popularly supported law. Changes in social, religious
or scientific values and thinking will not make those freedoms vary
depending on the political allegiances of legislators or philosophical
Though neutral antipredilections of Supreme Court majorities.
democracy may not guarantee that the popular desires of AfricanAmericans or other minority communities for more representation will be
satisfied by democratic law creation, neutral anti-democracy, at least,
guards against all public opinion being translated into oppressive and
unfair law.

308. See supra notes 217-37 and accompanying text.

